In the last few weeks McConnell has had the Senate confirming judicial nominees but refused to bring a second Covid relief bill to a vote, even though one was passed by the House in May. And despite promises to replace Obamacare with a Republican alternative, neither the Trump White House nor Congressional Republicans have produced a healthcare bill.Įven the greatest economic downturn since the Great Depression, combined with the worst public health catastrophe since the 1918 influenza, has not motivated Senate Republicans to either vote on Democrats’ relief bill or produce one of their own. When then Vice President Biden attempted to persuade McConnell to stop blocking a bill by explaining the good that it would do, he replied " You must be under the mistaken impression that I care." In the first two years of the Trump Administration, when Republicans had both the Presidency and both houses of Congress, their only significant legislative achievement was the passage of massive deficit-financed tax cuts. McConnell’s disinterest in policy is pronounced and of long standing. These three factors are severely aggravated by a fourth: The Republican Party as currently configured has few policy objectives beyond tax cuts and judicial appointments. Once Donald Trump entered the White House, Republicans once again embraced stimulus to fight Covid. As soon as Barack Obama won, Republican opposition to the expansion of healthcare or further stimulus instantly became unanimous. Bush was President, he helped pass major expansions of Medicare and a huge stimulus bill to combat the Global Financial Crisis. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell – in my judgement the most-effective Senate tactician since his Kentucky predecessor Henry Clay – has made this the core of his strategy since 2009. So the politically optimal strategy (in a game theoretic sense) for a party with control of the Congress but not the White House is to oppose or sabotage any Presidential initiative, even the most necessary one, and then let Americans feel the pain from that failure and blame the President and his or her party for it. In 2014, for example, only 36% of Americans could identify which party was in control of Congress (this is a useful reminder that the largest divide in politics is not between Democrats and Republicans, but between those who follow politics and those who don’t).
Most Americans pay little attention to politics. Third, the public holds the President responsible for whatever happens. This was a crucial factor in the long era of bipartisanship that stretched from the end of World War II until the 1980s. Democratic control of the House of Representatives was so entrenched that Republicans there could either get along or be ignored. Instead, bipartisan cooperation is most likely when one party is so dominant that members of the minority have no choice but to cooperate if they want to have any influence at all.
And as long as the parties are at parity, both have a chance to win those spoils. But if they control the government, they can use its power to benefit their supporters a lot. If they work with the other party, every American will benefit a little. Politicians want to deliver benefits to their supporters (and themselves). But today, both parties can hope of a complete reversal of their fortunes every two years. For most of American history, one party or the other dominated. Second, the parties are closely balanced. And the spoils of victory are control of the American government, the richest and most powerful institution in human history. First, competition for political power is zero-sum. Why won’t the parties compromise to help us get through the current crisis? There are four basic features of American politics driving that outcome.
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